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Recent Antitrust l)evelopnlents in the 
European Econo1nic Cotnmunity 
By DR. \VILLY SCHLI.EDER 
~fembers of the Bar of the City of New York have devoted a considerable 
amount  of  thought to  the  understanding and interpretation  of  the  EEC 
antitrust rules. Their written contributions-apart from the efforts of fillingL 
in forms  in order to  notify restrictive  trade practices to  the  Commission-
are not less  important."! appreciate therefore  the opportunity to speak  to  · 
you about recent antitrust developments in the EEC. 
The purpose of the Community is  to  establish an ever closer union  be-
tween the European peoples and to assure steady expansion, balanced trade 
and fair competition. To that end it has to establish a system ensuring that 
competition shall not be distorted in the Common l\Jarket. There is  a close 
relationship between this task and the elimination of trade barriers between 
Member States. 
Antitrust policy aims in the first place at efficiency in the economic process 
and at defending the consumer's interests. EEC competition policy must in 
addition to  this traditional role of antitrust ensure that the abolished trade 
barriers and restrictions, previously imposed by  state legislation and acts of 
Governments, are  not replaced by  private trade barriers. If we  would not 
fight  vigorously  against agreements and practices threatening the unity of 
the market, the objectives of the Community could not be realized. Another 
aim of the competition policy of the Community is  to guarantee fair com· 
petition.  Open  frontiers  within  the  Community  are only  acceptable  for 
busines~men and politicians if all enterprises face  equal conditions. 
That means for example adjusting commercial state monopolies in a way 
that excludes legal or practical discriminations.  Upon request of the Com-
mission,  Member States  have  abolished  most  of the  existing  commercial 
state monopolies.  Where such  monopolies still subsist  they  will  either be 
abolished or ad  jus  ted  in  the  forseeable  future.  Some  years  ago,  it was  for 
example impossible to  buy German or Dutch cigarettes in France or Italy, 
as  those markets were reserved to the national tobacco industry. Today you 
will find  in these countries all current brands of cigarettes. 
Considerable  progress  has  also  been  achieved  in  the area of state sub-
sidies.  Member States increasingly use  regional incentives and subsidies in 
favor of certain branches of industry as  an instrument of their structural 
policy. In trying to direct investments to  their territory, Member States in 
the past outbid each other with regional incentives. This favored shopping 
around on the investor's side,  decreased  the efficiency  of regional  policies 
Editor's Note: The author is Director General for Competition, European Commu· 
nity. His address was delivered under the auspices of the Association's Committee 
on Foreign and Comparative Law, Isaac Shapiro, Chairman. 
212 
Reprint  from  the  Record  of  the Association of  the  Bar  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  April  1972 
ARY EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  COMIVfUNITY 
and led to distortions of competition. In October of last yca1·,  lhc .Member 
Stat('~ adopted a proposal of the Commission to  limit the ceiling of regional 
inc<:ntivcs in  the central regions of the Community to  2or;{,  of the value of 
a  given  investment. The Member States also agreed on certain  principles. 
Regional  assistance  must,  for exnmple.  be  proportionate  to  the  particular 
difficulties of the region concerned. You  Gill  imagine how far  the Commis-
sion will  have  to interfere with national policies which, so  far,  have devel-
oped independently. 
Recent devclopmetils in the field of antitrust demonstrate the firm inten-
tion of the Commission to apply effectively Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome 
Treaty and the equivalent rules of the Treaty for Coal and Steel. I can only 
highlight some features o£  this policy. 
Before doing this let me make a  few  remark~ on the degree of economic 
integration which has been accomplished so far. 
Iviost enterprises take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Com-
mon Market. Statistics on the increase of trade between lVIember States are 
impressive. The number of subsidiaries founded across the internal borders 
and the amount of cooperatio11 between enterprises from different Member 
States have also increased in recent years. Perhaps the Europeans did not dis-
cover Europe until after some American multinational enterprises did, but 
they are now well on their way. Yet, we are far from having completed the 
process of integration. Especially medium-size firms  are in many cases  not 
able or not sufficiently organized  to  seek  customers outside of their home 
markets. And in some important branches of industry invisible trade barriers 
subsist for there arc still  politically motivated preferences of puhlic inves-
tors for home made goods and services. But generally competition is  inten-
sive enough to induce the harmonization of prices and to pass a  part of the 
benefit of the Common l\J arket on to the consumers. 
Where consumer prices still differ from country to country explanations 
can often be found in different rates of the added value tax, structural dif-
ferences  in  trade  or different  pricing  policies  of :Member States.  On  the 
other hand, we observe enterprises carving up the markets by imposing arti-
ficial trade barriers 011  buyers. It is  conscquemly one of the essentials of the 
EEC antitrust policy to oppo~c strongly any agreement or concerted practice 
tending to infringe upon the principle of the unity of the Common Market. 
EEC antitrust has been shaped by regulations of the Council of Ministers 
and of the Commission, by policy declarations and by more than fifty anti-
trust decisions of the Commission as well as over twenty rulings of the Euro-
pean Court in Luxembourg. l'vlany cases have been settled without a formal 
decision when the members of a cartel put an end to violations or adapted 
their agreements  to  the  EEC antitrust rules  after an  intervention  by  the 
Commission. 
Within the next month we shall publish for the first time a report on EEC 
competition policy. It may be a useful instrument for businessmen and even 
for members of the Bar seeking guidelines as to the different aspects of EEC 
antitrust enforcement. 
The Commission and the European Court have  never developed a  doc-THE  RECORD 
trine of jJer sc  violations. In theory, any restraint of trade may be outweighed 
by positive effects as  described in Aniclc 85,  Section 3 of the EEC Treaty, 
i.e., may contribute lo the improvement of production or distribution or to 
the promotion of technical or economic  prog-rc~s. However, certain types of 
agreements haYc  little chance of obtaining· an exemption under Article 85, 
Section 3· 
Horizontal agreements between producers or dealers to allocate markets, 
customers or quotas never haYe  been exempted. The effort of the German 
steel  industry  to get an  authorization  for  a  quota-system  failed  last year. 
Price-fixing  agreements  affecting  trade  between  Member States  have  also 
practically no chance of survival. This is  also true for all agreements estab-
lishing  exclu:sh·e  reciprocal  commercial  relations  between  producers  and 
dealers, or for systems under which competitors aggregate their rebates. 
As  to exclusive distributor agreements and other vertical restrictive prac-
tices invoh·ing producers and dealers,  the Commission continues to apply 
the principles set  forth  in  the Grundig, Kodah,  Agfa-Gevaert and Omega 
cases prohibiting various restrictions on exports between Member States and 
certain types of selecti\'e selling. Very  recently it attacked two automobile 
producers  for  applying export  prohibitions  between  Member  States.  Ex-
cept for a  very limited number, all agreements notified to  the Commission 
which contained export bans have been modified in a  way  to enai)}e  them 
to  benefit  from  the general  exemption  of  Rcg·ulation  67 j67, granting ex-
emption to a category of exclusive distribution agreements. This means that 
these agreements leave open to dealers and consumers the possibility of buy-
ing goods in any of the Member States under normal conditions. 
Let me now turn to licenses of industrial property rights. 
The merging of six  national markets (and,  soon,  ten  national  markets) 
into a single Common l\Jarkct makes it necessary  to  facilitate the free mar· 
keting of technology across the borders. There have  alway~ been tendencies 
to use industrial property rights to carve up the Common 1\f arket. 
In the Parhe-Davis case  the European Court ruled  that a  Dutch patent 
holder for antibiotics could preYent imports into the Netherlands of such 
patented products from Italy, where they had been freely so;d in the absence 
of any patent protection of pharmaceuticals in  that country. The free  im-
portation of the patented antibiatics would have impaired the essence of the 
Dutch patent. Nevertheless,  the Commission argued in  this case  that a  na-
tional patent should no~ be invoked in order to forbid the importation of a 
product which was put into circulation in one of the .!\{ember States either 
by  the patent-holder himself or with his consent. 
In full  harmony with this positioiJ, the Court held, in  the landmark de-
cision of Deutsche GrammojJhon ,  ..  Metro of June 8,  1971,  that it was illegal 
to use a copyright law of a  i\Iember State in order to  prevent the marketing 
in  that .:\Jcmhcr State of phonograph  records which  were sold  in another 
iVIember State by the owner of the copyright or with his consent. The Court 
reached this conclusion in applying· Article 3fi  of the Treaty. Article 36 per-
mits prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importations, exportations or 
tramit of goods which  arc justified  in order  to  protect industrial or com-EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  COMMUNITY  215 
mercia!  property. But such prohibitions-says Article go-shall  not "consti-
tute either a  means of arbitrary discrimination or a disRuiscd restriction on 
trade between Member States." 
The Court stated that the ohjccti\'c of a  unified Common l\farkct could 
not  he  achieved if  industrial  property  rights  could  be  invoked merely  be-
cause they were still national in character. As I see it by  this decision the so-
calicd "ten itorial principle" has been abolished for all indmtrial property 
rights.  Patents,  trademarks and  copyrights are  certainly  different in  their 
origin aud purpose. These differences are of impmtancc in defining the sub-
ject matter of the different types of property rights which are protected by 
the Treaty. But these differences are of no importance at all when we  have 
to answer the question of whether the national character of industrial prop-
erty rights is a reason to forbid the free circulation of protected goods within 
the Common Market. Since some authors question the applicability of the 
Deutsche Grammophon v.  Metro ruling to patent iaw, I hope that the Court 
may soon have an opportunity to clarify the situation. 
Independently of the interpretation of article 36 by the European Court, 
the Commission will continue to apply Articles 85  and 86 where enterprises 
through agreements, concerted practices or by virtue of a dominant position 
use  industrial  property rights in order  to  keep  the Common  Market sep-
arated along national boundaries. The principles developed in the Grundig 
case  and  in  the Sirena  ruling of the  Co11rt,  prohibiting the  use  of trade-
marks to restrain trade between Member States, have not become obsolete. 
This jurisprudence is consistent with Regulation 67/67 which does not apply 
if the parties exercise patent or trademark or similar rights in order to pre-
vent dealers or consumers from buying protected products lawfully put into 
circulation in any part of the Community. 
On December 22,  1971  the Commission for  the first  time took two deci-
sions referring to  license  agreements. These are  the Burroughs j Geha  and 
Burroughs  f  Del  planque cases.  The licensed  product is  a  new carbon black 
paper which is  produced in Italy, France and Germany. Both licensees, the 
French firm Delplanque and the German firm Gcha, received non-exclusive 
production licenses for some patents and exclusive production licenses for 
others. There arc no territorial restrictions on sales:  licensor and licensees 
sell  the  licensed  products everywhere  in  the Common  Market on a  non-
exclusive basis. The market share of the product amounts to about 10%  in 
France and Germany. 
In order to give guidelines to  industry the Commission emphasized that 
in  the case of a  non-exclusive patent and know-how  license  the  following 
obligations shall not be treated as restraints: 
1.  The  obligation  to grant  no sublicenses  except  to  wholly  dependent 
companies. The reason for this is  obvious; only the owner of a patent right 
can  authorize  the exploitation of the  patent.  As  far as  know-how is  con-
cerned, the secret can only be guaranteed if the know-how is  not communi-
cated to third parties ·.vithout the consent of its "owner." 
2.  The obligation to keep the know-how secret. The Commission permits ---------·----------~  ~~~~  -~-- ,..,......,..--~~  ~~----~--~ 
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this obligation, even for the time after the agreement has ended, as  a  pre· 
requisite for commercializing know,how.  ~ 
3·  The obligatiotz imjwsed on the licensee not to use the know-how after 
the termination of the agreement. This has been accepted with some hesita-
tion as it is difficult not to usc knowledge. But it is  one of the conditions of 
commercializing know-how in order to stimulate its communication. 
4·  The obligation to produce the licensed products in sufficient quantities 
and to follow  the technical instructions of the licensor. These are deemed to 
be necessary  to allow quantitatively sufficient and technically unobjection-
able use of the right granted to the patentee. 
5·  ·The obligation  to  mar,q_  the products fabricated  under the license  so 
that their origin can  be  detected. This has been accepted in order to allow 
the licensor control of the quality and quantity of the products. 
6.  The obligation  to  settle  disputes  by  arbitration.  Another important 
statement in the Burroughs decisions concerns the validity of exclusive li-
censes. The Commission held that an exclusive production license could be 
a  restraint forbidden  under Article  85,  Section  1.  Exclusivity restricts  the 
ability of a patentee to exploit the patent and thus limits the access of non· 
licensees to the new technology. 
Further decisions will give us further explanation of the philosophy un-
derlying this statement and the possible impact on license agreements. But 
we  may already say this:  the Commission rejects the idea of basing antitrust 
considerations on the patentee's right to exclude. This right describes  the 
legal position of the patentee and the licensees but cannot be used as  an 
argument to justify restrictions the licensor wants to accept for himself. 
And a second statement can be made: the reservation of a reasonable re-
ward to the investor is an important element in antitrust considerations de-
fining, from an economic point of view,  the strictly necessary obligations to 
make licensing possible and to assure the use of the patent as  described in 
the  patent legislation.  Any obligation  beyond  that limit may fall  under 
Article 85, Section 1, if it has an appreciable effect on competition and trade 
between Member States. 
The reward  to  the  inven· •r therefore  has  no  preestablished content in 
terms of per se  permissable restrictions outside of the "no-restraint list" of 
the Commission. This list will, of course, be worked out in further detail on 
the occasions of future decisions. 
In  the  Burroughs  cases  the  Commission  issued  negative  clearances,  as 
there were no appreciable effects on competition. It reached this conclusion 
considering the small market share of the parties to  the agreement as  well 
as  the important fact  that licensor and licensees  sell  the  product (under 
different trademarks) everywhere in the Common Market. 
Contrary to the Burroughs decisions, the Commission may in other cases 
bring exclusive production Hcenses under Article 85, Section 1, especially if 
the patented products account for a high percentage of the relevant market. -· 
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If Articie 85,  Section  1  applies, the final  judgment on the validity of the 
exclusive covenant \Vill  be  te&ted  according to  the standards of Article  8~;, 
Section 3· The first question in this context· will be:  -
Does  the  license  agreerncnt  (not  the exclusiYityl)  in  the  particular case 
contribute Lo  the improvement of the  production or distribution of goods 
or to the promotion of technical or economic progress preserving to the con· 
sumers an equitable share of the profit? 
If the answer to this question is "Yes"(this will normally be the case) and 
the agreement does not eliminate competition for a substantial part of the 
product market (clause (b) of Article 85, Section 3), the next question will be: 
Are the restrictions in the agreement indispensable to such improvements or 
to such promotion (clause (a)  of Article 85,  Section 3)?  The answer to this 
question will be the crucial test for the exclusivity clause. If there are  less 
restrictive ways  to exploit the patent in the existing competitive situation, 
the Article 85(3) exemption will not be granted. 
This concept permits a conciliation between the objectives of the patent 
system  and the aim of antitrust enforcement.  Its application may  lead to 
the result that exclusive production licenses can more easily be justified than 
the exclusivity clause in grant-back arrangements. 
The Commission will  in  the  very  near future  decide  two  other license 
cases.  One concerns agreements  between  the  U.S.  firm,  Davidson  Rubber, 
and Common .Market licensees;  the other, an agreement between a French 
licensor and the Japanese Nagoya Rubber Co. These decisions will, among 
other problems, treat the grant-back obligation and restrictions imposed on 
licensees outside the EEC. 
Before I  turn to  the cases applying Article 86  of the  EEC treaty, let me 
make a few  remarks on other recent decisions relating to Article 85  and on 
possible legislation providing for class  exemption under Article 85(3). 
In 1971  the Commission reached 19 antitrust decisions, considerably more 
than in any year before, and on rather important issues. For the first  time, 
an enterprise was fined for providing false evidence to the Commission in an 
antitrust case. Also, several horizontal cartels between producers and dealers 
were declared to be unlawful. 
The Commission  also  continued grant exemptions  under Article  85(3) 
and to issue negative clearances for agreements held to improve the competi-
tive situation or to have  no appreciable effect  on competition. A negative 
clearance was  even granted for a joint selling agreement (SAFCO  case)  in-
volving small firms. 
In studying these decisions you will find  little inclination to adopt rigid 
attitudes. There is  a clear-cut tendency to  favor  positive types of co-opera-
tion,  to  tolerate minor restraints,  and to  apply finn!1css  in cases  of major 
restraints and any obligations contrary to  the unity of the common market. 
Two decisions may be of specific interest to U.S.  lawyers. In the Henkelf 
Colgate case, a joint research agreement was accepted as lawful under Article 
85(3),  though the market share of the  two  enterprises was  important. The 
joint research, however, was held to be an appreciable restraint of competi-
tion,  in spite of the  fact  that no obligation was  agreed  to other than the THE  RECORD 
joint research. The freedom  to  go  on with  independent research  work  in 
the area covered by  the agreem1.:nt  would be of no practical value, said the 
Commi!ision,  because  the  parties agreed  to  license  the joint research com-
pany with respect to research results achieved independently. 
The second decision involves a  recent manifestation of the EEC Quinitw 
cases, in which the Commission refused, in fixing fines,  to  take into account 
fines  imposed in the Am'. rican  Quinine cases.  The total  fines  imposed  by 
the Commission equalled Ssoo,ooo. This decision may  be  of special interest 
to students of conflicts of law, especially penal law. 
Under special legislation of the Council of Ministers the Commission has 
power to provide for class exemptions within the framework of Article 85(3). 
\V'e  shall try to adopt such provisions this year for agreements tending to 
favor  the specialization of small- anrl medium-sized firms.  Whether we can 
do something to  grant class  exemption for certain types  of restrictions  in 
patent and know-how license agreements, is still an open question. 
Let me now turn the page to comment on Article 86.  Apart from some 
marginal  remarks of European Court when answering questions of inter-
pretation submitted to it by national civil courts, until recently only a few 
official statements were made concerning this Article. 
In 1971  the Commission started to  apply Article 86  by  reaching two de-
cisions, which were very different in nature. The GEMA decision illustrates 
what kind of conduct may be judged to be an ;;abuse" of a dominant posi-
tion. The Continental Can  case deals with the application of Article 86  to 
mergers. 
Article 86  declares illegal  the abuse  of a  dominant  position within the 
Common Market or within a substantial part of it. 
In the GEMA case,  little effort was  necessary  to show  that the German 
counterpart of ASCAP occupied a  dominant position.  GEMA  is  the only 
company in Germany representing authors of music in order to exploit their 
copyrights. The Commission merely said  that GEMA occupies a dominant 
position in Germany,  a  substantial  part of the  Community,  for  it has  110 
competitors. 
The decision  mentions a  number of abuses  in  the  behavior of GEMA 
vis-a-vis  the owners of the  copyrights,  their own  members,  the  editors of 
music,  the  producers of records  and  the  importers of records  and sound-
recording equipment into Germany. 
It is  a rather complicated, yet economically and even socially,  an impor-
tant decision.  With regard to owners of copyrights,  the Commission found 
discriminations  against  citizens  and  companies  of  other  Member  States. 
Foreign editors and German editors depending on foreign companies were, 
for example, not admitted to ordinary membership. 
Furthermore, the character of the association tied up members in such a 
way  that  they could  not think of authorizing other companies  to  exploit 
their rights.  GEMA paid a  premium for  membership fidelity  and did not 
allow splitting up the copyrights according to the field of use but demanded 
a  total transfer of the right. The Commission's decision entitled the copy-
right owners t.o  authorize different companies to exploit different categories 
of the rights, i.e., radio stations, editors, film or record producers. 
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The statutory 2o-ycar period before a composer of music could hope to 
get payments out of the pension fund was reduced to five  years,  the waiver 
of ordinary jurisdiction was outlawed and the vesting of pension rights was 
upheld in cases of cancellation of membership. GEMA is  also no longer en-
titled to collect money for parts of records which do not involve copyrights 
and for records imported or rc-imported to Germany by dealers, if copyright 
fees  have already been paid for such records  in Germany or elsewhere in 
the EEC. 
The Commission will have to  take similar decisions this year with regard 
to other associations like GEMA in other Member States. The GEMA de-
cision was appealed but the appeal has been withdrawn. 
Because the Continental Can case is under appeal to the European Court, 
I  shall limit my  remarks concerning it.  - ·  -
As you may know, the Commission ruled last year that Continental Can's 
acquisition of a Dutch cmnpetitor constituted an abuse of a dominant posi-
tion. As  early as  1966,  the Commission in a memorandum on the problem 
of concentration expressed  the opinion that an attempt  to  monopolize  a 
market could be  an  abuse  in the sense  of Article  86.  It refused  to  limit 
Article 86  only to cases of market behavior. As  any action by the occupant 
of a  dominant position may come  under Article 86,  structural changes of 
the market are not excluded. 
Not the merger as  such is  criticized, but the elimination of actual or po· 
tential competition in merging with a  competitor. The acquisition by  an 
enterprise in a dominant position of a competitor, resulting in further re-
ducing competition, may have exactly the same adverse effects as  the exam-
ples of abusive behavior described in clause (b) of Article 86  (the limitation 
of production markets or technical developments to the prejucl.ice  of con-
sumers). As  it can hardly be denied that the freedom of choice to  the con-
sumer is  essential for competition, the elimination of this choice as  well as 
its further reduction by  a dominating enterprise can prejudice the interests 
of consumers. There is  no economic or other reason  to  limit Article 86  to 
market behavior. The examples set forth in clause  (b)  of Article 86  show 
this clearly. 
Furthermore, the application of Article 86 does not depend on a finding 
that the dominant position has been used in any way  whatever to achieve 
the disapproved result. It is sufficient if a result incompatible •with  the pur-
poses of the Rome Treaty is due to an action of an enterprise in a dominant 
position. 
The Commission's decision defines the dominant position of Continental 
Can with regard to  a given product market and a given geographical area, 
although Article  86  does  not specifically  require such  definition.  It is  of 
interest to  note that the Commission's finding does  not concern the entire 
packaging market but only the product markets for packaging meat and fish 
and certain metal closures for glass jars. 
According  to  the  Commission,  enterprises  are  in  a  dominant  position 
when their scope for independent behavior is  such that they can take their 
decisions  without  paying substantial  attention  to  competitors,  buyers  or 
suppliers. This may occur if either their share of the market or their market 
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share coupled with their technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, en-
ables him to  determine prices or to  control production or distribution in 
a substantial part of the market. 
The Continental Can decision, which asked the company to submit dives-
titure plans before July 1st of this year with respect to its Dutch acquisition, 
is  certainly a  landmark in the short history of EEC antitrust enforcement. 
There is  no doubt that antitrust has become  an important feature of EEC 
policy and that its role is likely to continue undiminished after the enlarge-
ment of the Community. 
I 
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